The foreign ministers of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) signed a new peace agreement on 27 June 2025 under the auspices of the US.
The agreement aims to foster long-term peace, and increased economic trade and security. The DRC is one of Africa’s largest nations, with over 110 million people. Rwanda has a population of 14 million.
After three decades of war and tensions between the two neighbours since the aftermath of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the hope is that this agreement will establish the foundations for progress that benefits both nations.
It was the Donald Trump administration’s moment to illustrate the effectiveness of its “transactional” foreign policy, focused on exchanges and short-term benefits for each actor.
Most of the agreement’s details remained undisclosed until its signing. One aspect that’s surfaced was the claim that the DRC abandoned its demand for the removal of Rwandan soldiers from its territory. The Congolese government, research groups and the UN have accused Rwanda of supplying military aid, including soldiers, to the March 23 Movement (M23), which has been at war with the government in Kinshasa since 2021. The Rwandan government denies any active involvement but has some sympathies for the Congolese rebel group.
Under the June 2025 agreement, each side provided concessions and demands that are perhaps easier said than done. Both countries also want to show the Trump administration their willingness to negotiate and make a deal. This is in the hopes of future deals with the US, which Trump has remained vague on.
The DRC has immense mineral wealth, including gold, diamonds, tungsten, coltan, tin and lithium. These latter minerals are used in computer chips, batteries and other technologies.
Read more: Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group seeks local power in DRC, not just control over mining operations
The question is whether this latest agreement will lead to peace in the DRC. The likely answer is no, based on research on instability in the eastern DRC, Rwandan foreign policy and the security and political dynamics between Rwanda and the DRC for over 15 years.
This is mainly because
key players involved in the crisis were left out of negotiations
no provisions are made for enforcement
the opportunities for US companies remain questionable given the lack of security in the mining regions.
The roots of the crisis
After the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, former genocide perpetrators used the DRC’s vast size as cover to plan attacks on Rwanda. They intended to return to Rwanda to finish the genocide. The consequences led to the First Congo War (1996-1997) and the Second Congo War (1998-2003).
It was during the bloody second war that the DRC was carved up by multiple rebel groups aligned with various nations and political actors. The UN accuses Rwanda and Uganda of carrying out a massive illegal mineral trade. Both nations deny this.
The consequences of the conflict are still felt over 20 years later. Despite multiple peace agreements, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, an estimated 120 rebel groups remain active in the Congo.
One of them, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), aims to return Rwanda to ethnic division and the genocide. The Rwandan government fears the group’s genocide and hate ideology.
Additionally, the FDLR and other extremist actors such as Wazalendo target the Banyarwanda. This ethnic group, residing primarily in eastern DRC, is historically related to Rwanda. It has been the target of attacks, which have forced tens of thousands of people to flee into Rwanda.
Read more: The Banyamulenge: how a minority ethnic group in the DRC became the target of rebels – and its own government
These attacks led to the resurrection of the M23. Despite its failures in 2013, the M23 scored major advances in late 2021 in response to attacks on the Banyarwanda. The rebel group led a successful military campaign that occupied large swathes of territory in eastern DRC.
Their success is largely attributed to the Rwandan Defence Forces, despite Kigali denying this claim.
Concessions from each nation
The latest peace agreement addresses the security, political and economic interests of both nations.
The specifics are still unavailable. However, several assumptions based on the framework and leaked reports can be made.
The first is that both nations must respect each other’s territorial sovereignty and stop aiding rebel forces. This will include joint security coordination, and working with the existing UN peacekeeping mission. Additionally, Congolese refugees who fled eastern DRC – estimated to be over 80,000 – will be allowed to return. Finally, the two nations will establish mechanisms to foster greater economic integration.
The DRC has also signalled its willingness to attract American investors. DRC’s vast mineral wealth remains largely underdeveloped. American investment could develop mining that’s safer and extracts larger amounts of minerals than current methods. Kinshasa has also agreed to combat corruption and simplify the tax system.
While most of these incentives would be aimed at mineral extraction companies, they also include private security firms. The Congolese military’s inability to defeat the M23 highlights a problematic security environment that some in the DRC believe can be addressed through foreign intervention. However, these security guarantees are still relatively unknown and face complications that could affect the success of any agreement.
The weaknesses
There are a number of reasons this latest agreement is unlikely to lead to peace.
First, the M23 did not participate in the negotiations. Given that they are the primary military actor in eastern DRC, their commitment to a peace process cannot be guaranteed.
Second, other rebel forces in different parts of the country will feel left out too. They could see this agreement as an opportunity to press for greater concessions from the Congolese government.
Third, there are few mechanisms to enforce the agreement. Since the Second Congo War, there have been multiple treaties, agreements and disarmament programmes with little success. The Pretoria Accord between Rwanda and the DRC in 2002 did not lead to long-term peace. The M23’s name is a nod to their anger over a failed 2009 agreement. In 2024, Rwanda and Congo nearly reached an agreement under Angola’s mediation, but Angola stepped down. The process was then taken over by Qatar and later the US.
Lastly, American investors may be deterred by the security, regulatory and corruption issues that plague the DRC. Even if the Congolese government promises to address these issues, it lacks the necessary capabilities to fulfil its commitment.
